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watch coordinator George Zimmerman of second-degree-murder
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man “feared for his life” in his encounter with Martin and that
“anybody would think anybody walking down the road, stopping
and turning and looking—if that’s exactly what [Martin did]—is
suspicious.” Scientists and legal scholars have concluded that
On August 9, 2014, white police officer Darren Wilsonshot an unarmed black civilian named Michael Brown.In the wake of the extensive media coverage and pub-
lic scrutiny that followed, the tragic incident triggered a federal
civil-rights investigation and renewed a broader national dia-
logue about the perception of black males as inherently dan-
gerous, threatening, or criminal—and the role of those percep-
tions in perpetuating racial inequality in the United States.1 A
grand jury decision not to indict Wilson on murder charges
elicited highly polarized reactions from the general public,
which ranged from wholehearted support for Officer Wilson to
further accusations of racial bias against the prosecutor in the
case and against the predominantly white grand jury charged
with making the decision.2 The President of the United States
addressed the diverse sentiments of the American people: 
There are Americans who agree with it [the Ferguson
grand jury decision] and there are Americans who are
deeply disappointed—even angry. . . . We have made
enormous progress in race relations over the course of the
past several decades. I have witnessed that in my own life,
and to deny that progress, I think, is to deny America’s
capacity for change. But what is also true is that there are
still problems—and communities of color aren’t just mak-
ing these problems up. Separating that from this particu-
lar decision, there are issues in which the law too often
feels as if it is being applied in a discriminatory fashion.3
On March 4, 2015, the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) released a report of findings in its investigation of the
Ferguson, Missouri, criminal-justice system. The report con-
tributed to the still-growing body of literature acknowledging
contemporary racial inequality and recognizing that these dis-
parities may not be explained on the basis of people’s explicit,
intentional biases alone. In the report, the DOJ described evi-
dence of systematic racial discrimination in the community’s
policing and municipal court practices. Observed disparities in
treatment were “unexplainable on grounds other than race and
evidence that racial bias, whether implicit or explicit, has
shaped law enforcement conduct,” resulting in what they con-
cluded to be disproportionate harm to Ferguson’s African-
American residents.4 In discussing the DOJ report, Attorney
General Eric Holder described Ferguson as “a community
where this harm frequently appears to stem, at least in part,
from racial bias—both implicit and explicit.”5
Although the possible effects of implicit bias on justice-sys-
tem outcomes should be considered at each decision point in
case processing, we focus in this article on the potential effects
of implicit bias in the decision making of everyday American
citizens who are randomly selected to serve on grand juries
and in jury trials. We begin with a brief explanation of the con-
cept of implicit bias and examine one type of intervention that
some believe could address this subtler form of racial bias in
jury decision making: a specialized jury instruction. 
IMPLICIT BIAS AND ITS ROLE IN JUROR DECISION
MAKING
In understanding how racial bias can continue to operate in
the context of the modern American jury, one must account for
both forms of racial bias identified by the Attorney General and
by the DOJ in the Ferguson report. This includes explicit bias,
the form of bias that a person intentionally endorses (and the
traditional definition of racial prejudice that most people rec-
ognize), but also implicit bias, a form of bias that occurs when
a person makes associations between a group of people and par-
ticular traits that then operate without self-awareness to affect
one’s perception of, understanding of, judgment about, or
behavior toward others.6 People develop these associations (i.e.,
attitudes and stereotypes) between particular social groups and
particular qualities (for example, one study showed that many
participants implicitly associate “black” with “guilty,” and other
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legal decision makers “are often unaware of the extent to which
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likely to find reasonable the individual’s claim that he felt his life
was being threatened.” See Dana Ford, Juror: ‘No Doubt’ That
George Zimmerman Feared for His Life, CNN, July 16, 2013, avail-
able at http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/15/justice/zimmerman-juror-
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ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION (2012); Jerry
Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124
(2012).
13. Dan Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials: The Limited Effec-
tiveness of Legal Mechanisms, 75 DUKE L.J. 167 (2012).
14. Judicial Conference Criminal Jury Instructions, CALCRIM No.
101 (2013).
15. Specifically on burden of proof and relevant caselaw; e.g., Jeffrey
E. Pfeifer & James Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations: A
Modern Racism Perspective, 21 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1721 (1991);
Erick L. Hill & Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Nullification Instructions and Juror
Guilt Ratings: An Examination of Modern Racism, 16 CONTEMP. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 6 (1992).
16. See Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Mak-
ing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 621, 627-28, 630 (2005). Relevant jury instructions
differed across studies. Researchers coded each study to indicate
whether jury instructions were present or absent from the
research design.
17. Danielle M. Young et al., Innocent until Primed: Mock Jurors’
studies have shown associations between African-Americans
and negative characteristics such as aggression and hostility) as
they learn from their social environment (e.g., media, parental,
or peer role models).7 The influence of these attitudes or stereo-
types in producing a discriminatory response may occur invol-
untarily and without a person’s conscious intent. That is, indi-
viduals may explicitly report egalitarian racial attitudes but can
nevertheless still make racially biased decisions and behave in
racially biased ways.8
Findings in the scientific research literature demonstrate
how implicit bias can operate to distort a person’s interpreta-
tions of the evidence in a case. Racial stereotypes have been
found to play a role in how people perceive and interpret oth-
erwise ambiguous events. For example, one study found that
people interpret ambiguously hostile behavior as more hostile
when performed by a black compared with a white actor.9 Sim-
ilarly, people who test high on implicit racial bias were found
to be more likely to interpret ambiguous expressions in a neg-
ative manner (i.e., as angrier) on black faces (but not white
faces) compared with those who test low on implicit racial
bias.10 Another recent study found that presenting mock
jurors with images of darker-skinned (compared to lighter-
skinned) perpetrators biased their interpretations of ambigu-
ous evidence. Biased interpretations of the evidence, in turn,
predicted subsequent guilty verdicts.11
ADDRESSING IMPLICIT BIAS WITH JURORS
In recent years, court leaders across the country have rec-
ognized the challenge posed by implicit forms of bias and have
focused on addressing this issue in the criminal-justice system
through in-depth education and training of judges and court
staff.12 However, unlike with judges and court staff, the courts
have limited opportunities to educate jurors about the perni-
cious effects of complex psychological phenomena like
implicit bias. Most jurors in this country serve only for the
duration of a trial (typically two to three days) and then are
released from service. There is no time available during this
short period to provide the type of in-depth education that
judges and court staff may receive on strategies to reduce the
impact of implicit bias in their decision making. Other solu-
tions that might operate effectively in other settings are not
always feasible for use in jury trials, where these time con-
straints and additional resource limitations (e.g., funding,
staffing, technology) often prohibit more elaborate interven-
tions. For primarily practical reasons, courts have historically
relied on jury instructions to guide juror decision making.13
Presently, pattern jury instructions developed for use in state
and federal jury trials typically rely on the simple admonition
that jurors should not let “bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public
opinion influence [their] decision.”14 Only a few studies have
attempted to explore the utility of standard pattern jury instruc-
tions, but they have produced mixed findings.15 Specifically,
one meta-analysis of 16 mock-juror studies (a) found that mock
jurors were likely to “render longer sentences for other-race
defendants,” (b) found that racial bias in these mock-juror
studies was “more pronounced . . . for Black participants; when
community members were participants; and in published stud-
ies,” but (c) concluded that racial bias in mock juror verdicts
“decrease[d] when ecologically relevant procedures [were]
used.”16 Alternatively, one recent study showed that pattern
presumption-of-innocence instructions, “a core legal principle
specifically designed to eliminate bias,” actually primed greater
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Racially Biased Response to the Presumption of Innocence, 9 PLOS
ONE 1, 1, available at http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=
10.1371/journal.pone.0092365.
18. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Ratcliff et al., The Hidden Consequences of
Racial Salience in Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions, 16
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 200 (2010); Sophie Trawalter et al.,
Attending to Threat: Race-based Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322 (2008).
19. Brian Nosek, Implicit-Explicit Relations, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 65 (2007); Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury
Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1017 (2012); David Bal-
dus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings
from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); Jennifer L.
Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of
Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSY-
CHOL. SCI. 383 (2006).
20. See Kang et al., supra note 12.  In addition, the American Bar Asso-
ciation Criminal Justice Section assembled a task force that
attempted to develop its own specialized jury instruction on
implicit bias. (Personal communication with S. Cox and S. Red-
field  (June 3, 2013)).
21. E.g., Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit
Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835 (2002); E. Ashby Plant & Patri-
cia G. Devine, Responses to Other-Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Accep-
tance or Backlash?, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 486 (2001).
22. Lisa Legault et al., Ironic Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How
Motivational Interventions Can Reduce (But Also Increase) Prejudice,
22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1472 (2011).
23. See Nancy K. Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial
Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (2006).
24. Young et al., supra note 17.
25. See pages 113-114 for the specialized jury instruction used in this
experiment. We have annotated the experimental instruction we
tested, citing the existing scientific research evidence that formed
the theoretical basis for each of the components of the instruction.
26. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Court-
attention to race (i.e., to attend more to black individuals)
among mock jurors compared to an alternative matched-length
instruction.17 This type of attentional bias, in which decision-
makers focus more of their visual attention on black individu-
als, has been shown in other research to lead to racially biased
interpretations of events and racially biased decisions.18 When
considering this mixed evidence in combination with (a)
research indicating that people may not be able to consciously
correct for the effect(s) of their implicit biases because they are
often unaware that these biases exist and (b) evidence of racial
discrimination in actual jury trials, standard legal instructions
do not appear to offer a complete or reliable solution.19
As a next step, to address concerns of both implicit and
explicit racial bias among jurors, some judges and lawyers
have expressed interest in developing a specialized jury
instruction, with at least one midwestern district court judge
(now retired) having already used a specialized jury instruc-
tion on implicit bias at trial.20 Crafting clear, effective jury
instructions on the topic of implicit bias, however, requires
extensive subject-matter expertise for two main reasons. First,
subject-matter expertise is necessary to ensure that the lan-
guage and strategies used in the instruction are accurate
reflections of the state of the science. The high level of sub-
ject-matter expertise necessary to leverage lessons learned
from existing research and provide jurors with appropriate
debiasing strategies may not be available among the law-
trained professionals who typically comprise committees that
draft pattern jury instructions. Second, subject-matter exper-
tise is also needed to ensure that the developed instruction
intervention does not incorporate communication strategies
known to exacerbate expressions of racial bias in certain sub-
populations. For example, strategies that impress an extrinsic
motivation to be non-prejudiced (i.e., mandates and other
authoritarian language typical of jury instructions) may pro-
voke hostility and resistance from some individuals, failing to
reduce and perhaps even exacerbating expressions of preju-
dice.21 Instead, communications designed to foster intrinsic
egalitarian motivations may more effectively reduce both
explicit and implicit expressions of prejudice without eliciting
such backfire or backlash effects.22 These and other research
findings are important to consider for those looking to adopt
a jury instruction to minimize expressions of implicit biases
in juror judgment.
Any new jury instruction should be carefully evaluated to
determine its actual impact on decision making before broadly
promoting the instruction as a solution for general use in the
courtroom. Jury instructions designed to achieve specific cog-
nitive processing or decision-making objectives are not always
a completely effective solution, as has been well documented
in prior studies on instructions to disregard inadmissible evi-
dence.23 Empirical scrutiny is particularly important with any
jury instruction on implicit biases given the possibility that a
specialized instruction (a) may successfully reduce expres-
sions of racial bias with some jurors yet exacerbate expressions
of bias in others and/or (b) may serve to increase juror atten-
tion to race in a way that might increase the likelihood of
biased outcomes.24 To date, no known studies have examined
the efficacy of a specialized jury instruction informed by the
research on reducing implicit forms of bias. 
IMPLICIT-BIAS JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A MOCK-JUROR
EXPERIMENT
In the present study, we examined for the first time the effi-
cacy of a specialized jury instruction in reducing racial dispari-
ties in juror judgments.  The National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) consulted with nationally recognized social-science and
legal experts on implicit bias to develop a specialized jury
instruction for use in a web-based experiment with jury-eligible
U.S. citizens.25 In the study, NCSC adapted a trial scenario from
a seminal research study that had effectively demonstrated racial
bias in juror decision making (an effect which has since been
replicated in several experiments using similar if not identical
research methodologies). The trial scenario featured a defendant
who was charged with assault and battery with intent to cause
serious bodily injury. The defendant and victim were described
as teammates on a college basketball team, and the alleged
assault resulted from a locker-room fight. Prior studies showed
that white jurors tended to judge black defendants more harshly
118 Court Review - Volume 51  
Our Experimental Implicit-Bias Jury Instruction, Annotated1
Our system of justice depends on the willingness and ability of judges like me and jurors like you to make careful andfair decisions.2 What we are asked to do is difficult because of a universal challenge: We all have biases. We each makeassumptions and have our own stereotypes, prejudices, and fears.3 These biases can influence how we categorize the
information we take in.4 They can influence the evidence we see and hear, and how we perceive a person or a situation. They
can affect the evidence we remember and how we remember it. And they can influence the “gut feelings” and conclusions we
form about people and events.5 When we are aware of these biases, we can at least try to fight them.6 But we are often not
aware that they exist.  
We can only correct for hidden biases when we recognize them and how they affect us. For this reason, you are encouraged
to thoroughly and carefully examine your decision-making process to ensure that the conclusions you draw are a fair reflec-
tion of the law and the evidence.7 Please examine your reasoning for possible bias by reconsidering your first impressions of
the people and evidence in this case. Is it easier to believe statements or evidence when presented by people who are more like
you?8 If you or the people involved in this case were from different backgrounds—richer or poorer, more or less educated,
older or younger, or of a different gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation—would you still view them, and the evidence,
the same way?9
Please also listen to the other jurors during deliberations, who may be from different backgrounds and who will be viewing
this case in light of their own insights, assumptions, and even biases.10 Listening to different perspectives may help you to bet-
ter identify the possible effects these hidden biases may have on decision-making.11
Our system of justice relies on each of us to contribute toward a fair and informed verdict in this case. Working together,
we can reach a fair result.12
Footnotes 
1. We reprint here the specialized jury instruction used in the pre-
sent experiment, along with citations to the existing scientific
research evidence that formed the theoretical basis for each of
the instruction’s components. However, we are not suggesting
nor do we recommend that any court proceed to adopt this
instruction without further empirical testing to determine the
efficacy of this or any other instruction designed to address
implicit and explicit forms of bias in juror decision making.
2. When leadership sets an egalitarian example, others may also
pursue this goal (see Henk Aarts et al., Goal Contagion: Perceiv-
ing Is for Pursuing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 23 (2004)).  
3. To avoid potential backfire effects, instructional language
should reduce external pressure to comply (by avoiding author-
itarian language) and promote intrinsic motivation to counter-
act biases (E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Responses to
Other-Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash?, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 486 (2001); Jennifer A. Richeson &
Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism Versus
Color-Blindness on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
417 (2004); Lisa Legault et al., Ironic Effects of Antiprejudice
Messages: How Motivational Interventions Can Reduce (But Also
Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1472 (2011)).  
4. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Legault et al., supra note 3.
5. See Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Bias: The Guilty-
Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187
(2010); E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Internal and Exter-
nal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 811 (1998); Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators
White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEG.
STUDIES 886 (2010). On the effects of bias on perception and
judgment, and regarding how awareness of potential bias may
help trigger self-correction efforts, see Alexander R. Green et al.,
Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
1231 (2007). 
6. People often are not aware of their own biases. For people to
attempt to correct for bias, they must know that it is a problem
and also believe the problem to be self-relevant (see Timothy D.
Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Cor-
rection: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116
PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994); see also Duane T. Wegener et al.,
Flexible Corrections of Juror Judgments: Implications for Jury
Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 629 (2000); Duane T.
Wegener & Richard E. Petty, Flexible Correction Processes in
Social Judgment: The Role of Naive Theories in Corrections for Per-
ceived Bias, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (1995); Duane
T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Connection Model:
The Role of Naive Theories in Bias Correction, in 29 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 141 (Mark P. Zanna ed.,
1997)). 
7. A more deliberative mode of thinking may help to reduce
expressions of bias (see Ellen Langer et al., Decreasing Prejudice
by Increasing Discrimination, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
113 (1985); Maja Djikic et al., Reducing Stereotyping Through
Mindfulness: Effects on Automatic Stereotype-Activated Behaviors,
15 J. ADULT DEV. 106 (2008); see also Guthrie et al., supra note
4; Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & James R. P. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt
Determinations: A Modern Racism Perspective, 21 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1713 (1991)). 
8. For a discussion on processing fluency and perceptions of trust,
see Rolf Reber & Norbert Schwarz, Effects of Perceptual Fluency
on Judgments of Truth, 8 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 338
(1999); Adam L. Alter & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Uniting the
Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation, 13 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. (2009). See also Russell D. Clark & Anne
Maass, Social Categorization in Minority Influence: The Case of
Homosexuality, 18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 347 (1988), Masaki
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room: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367 (2000).
27. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An
Investigation of Prejudice against Black Defendants in the American
Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 215 (2001); but see
Mitchell et al., supra note 16.
28. Mock jurors who received the control instruction evaluated the
strength of the defense’s case in subtly different ways from partic-
ipants who received the specialized instruction. Specifically, no
differences were observed between conditions when the trial sce-
nario described the victim as white. Similarly, for participants who
received the specialized instruction, no differences were observed
than white defendants.26 Authors of those studies concluded
that the race of the victim may not be a critical factor in the
expression of this “white juror bias,” but other research suggests
otherwise.27 To account for this possibility, NCSC varied the race
of both the victim and the defendant across experimental condi-
tions of the trial scenario. NCSC also created a video of a trial
judge giving instructions on the applicable law, which included
either the specialized implicit-bias jury instruction or an alter-
native instruction of approximately equal length (creating
matched control groups for comparison purposes).
NCSC hired a market-research firm to recruit a sample of
jury-eligible mock jurors to participate in the study. Recruited
participants who met eligibility requirements received a brief
description of the study in which they were asked to assume
the role of a juror in a trial case.  Participants were randomly
assigned to one of eight possible conditions in the experiment:
They watched one of the two videotaped sets of jury instruc-
tions (with either the specialized implicit-bias instruction or
the control instruction imbedded) and then read one of four
possible versions of the mock-trial scenario describing the evi-
dence in the case against the defendant (varying the race of the
defendant and the victim). After the presentation of evidence,
mock jurors indicated whether they thought the defendant was
guilty and, if so, recommended a sentence. The mock jurors
also took the Race Implicit Association Test (IAT), a popular
online test developed by researchers to identify, measure, and
study implicit bias. A total of 901 jury-eligible adults partici-
pated in the study, which was conducted in May and June
2013. On the whole, the composition of the participant group
reflected the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the
broader national population. A large majority of participants
demonstrated a preference for whites on the Race IAT, which is
also consistent with other national studies.
Overall, white participants across all conditions in the pre-
sent study convicted white defendants at a slightly higher rate
(65%) than black defendants (59%), although this difference
was not statistically significant. The specialized instruction did
not appear to significantly influence mock-juror verdict pref-
erence, confidence in verdict, or sentence severity. The authors
were unable to replicate with this sample the traditional base-
line pattern of “white juror bias” (i.e., the higher rate of guilty
verdicts and harsher sentences for black defendants in control
conditions) observed in prior similar studies, which precluded
a complete test of the value of the specialized instruction.28
Because prior studies demonstrated or replicated the juror-
bias effect successfully in a number of different settings, with a
number of different types of trial scenarios, and with designs
that varied in ecological validity (i.e., degree of resemblance to
natural court settings), it is not likely that the findings of the
present study are attributable to the web-based nature of the
study design. It is possible that the specific legal instructions
provided in the present study differed in a meaningful way from
past studies and that those differences were ultimately responsi-
ble for eliminating the juror-bias effect. However, it is unlikely
that these differences are the primary reason why the juror-bias
effect was not observed, as in the months following this study,
we learned that other contemporaneous studies in which simi-
lar legal instructions were not provided also failed to replicate
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Yuki et al., Cross-Cultural Differences in Relationship- and Group-
Based Trust, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 48 (2005).
9. Perspective-taking may help to reduce the accessibility and
expression of stereotypes (see Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B.
Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing Stereotype Expres-
sion, Stereotype Accessibility & In-Group Favoritism, 78 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 708 (2000)).
10. Instructions that encourage people to attend to and appreciate
one another’s differences (i.e., a multiculturalism philosophy)
are more effective at reducing expressions of bias than instruc-
tions to ignore individual differences (i.e., a colorblindness phi-
losophy); the latter may induce a backfire effect, thereby
increasing expressions of prejudice (e.g., Evan P. Apfelbaum et
al., Seeing Race and Seeming Racist? Evaluating Strategic Color-
blindness in Social Interaction, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 918 (2008)). Note that the mere presence of a racial
minority on a panel of mostly white jurors may reduce the like-
lihood of a biased verdict (Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diver-
sity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006)).  
11. See Wegener et al., supra note 6. When individuals are held
accountable for the decision-making process itself, they tend to
think more deliberatively; however, when they are only held
accountable for the outcome, they may be more likely to
attempt to justify unjust decisions retrospectively (see Jennifer
S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999)). These instruc-
tions are designed to focus the juror on the process. In addition,
if people are made aware of their biases, those who endorse
egalitarianism but remain implicitly biased may actively correct
for bias in their decision making (see Leanne S. Son Hing et al.,
Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Responses Among Aver-
sive Racists, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 71 (2002)). In the
presence of a relatively egalitarian-minded group, an individ-
ual’s judgments may become less stereotypic (see Gretchen B.
Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Inter-
group Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 645 (2001)). 
12. Emphasizes goal-setting and leadership involvement; see foot-
note 2.
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between the conditions. However, when the victim was described
as black, mock jurors who received the control instruction judged
the defense’s case to be stronger when the defendant was also
described as black than when the defendant was described as
white. This pattern of findings in the control conditions, however,
does not replicate the traditional juror-bias effect. Additional
research is needed to fully understand the observed effect.  
29. E.g., Yoona Kang et al., The Nondiscriminating Heart: Lovingkind-
ness Meditation Training Decreases Implicit Intergroup Bias, 143 J.
the original juror-bias effect. One intriguing potential explana-
tion for the failure to replicate the juror-bias effect in the present
study and in contemporaneous studies is that over time and
with increased media scrutiny to racial inequality, Americans
may have become increasingly aware of implicit forms of bias.
They may be particularly sensitive in research and other settings
in which they know or suspect that their individual responses
are monitored for analysis, and this sensitivity may have been
heightened at the time the study was conducted (i.e., during the
Florida trial of George Zimmerman). This heightened level of
awareness and sensitivity may have prompted many participants
to spontaneously self-correct for possible expressions of racial
bias, regardless of whether or not they received the specialized
jury instruction. Future research should explore this possibility
and its implications for contemporary jurors. 
Despite the absence of a baseline race-bias effect for jurors,
the study provided some preliminary evidence to suggest that a
specialized instruction could alter expressions of bias in juror
judgments. White jurors who received these specialized
instructions produced a different pattern of judgments of the
strength of the defendant’s case compared with participants
who received a control instruction. Specifically, in control con-
ditions, white jurors perceived the defendant’s case as signifi-
cantly stronger when the alleged crime occurred between a
black defendant and a black victim, compared with the scenario
that involved a white defendant and a black victim. This differ-
ence was eliminated in the specialized-instruction conditions.
Further research is needed to fully examine the impact of such
an instruction under a variety of conditions. Additional
research could also explore why, absent any bias-reduction
intervention, the black-on-black crime in the present study pro-
duced the highest strength-of-case ratings for the defense. A
complementary effect was not observed in favor of white defen-
dants when the victim was described as white, discounting a
same-race explanation for the effect. Finally, we also did not
observe any clear evidence of “backlash effects” (in which
mock jurors might seem to treat black defendants more
harshly) after hearing an implicit-bias instruction, but small
sample sizes limited these analyses. Future studies that con-
tinue to explore the potential utility of this type of instructional
intervention should also be designed to answer this question. 
THE VIEW FROM HERE
In this article, we have stressed the importance of empiri-
cally testing any new bias-reduction intervention for efficacy
before full-scale adoption and implementation. While we have
provided the specialized jury instruction used in this experi-
ment, along with citations to the existing scientific research
evidence that formed the theoretical basis for each of the
instruction’s components, we are not suggesting that any court
proceed at this point simply to adopt this instruction and move
on: We do not have sufficient data at this time to support a rec-
ommendation to use this or any other specialized jury instruc-
tion to mitigate juror implicit bias. Based on the results of one
study, the specialized jury instruction designed to address
implicit and explicit forms of bias in juror decision making
does not appear to be the panacea some hoped for. However,
the research evidence continues to expand on a variety of
strategies for reducing bias in decision making. Social scien-
tists continue in earnest to search for and test innovative bias-
reduction interventions. New evidence now exists to demon-
strate the utility of some bias-reduction interventions that, at
the time this study was conducted, were considered only the-
oretically promising.29 Many more strategies continue to show
promise but have not yet received empirical scrutiny. As basic
research evidence builds on more innovative approaches to
addressing bias in decision making, the court community will
benefit in time. 
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